

28 March 1960

STAT

Dr. Walter W. Rostow
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Center for International Studies
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge 39, Massachusetts

Dear Walt:

Many thanks for your note of March 15 with the accompanying memorandum. I found your ideas and suggestions most interesting and I have passed it on to those here in the shop who will be working on "Summary". Also I shall see that it gets to the proper quarters in State.

It was good to see you the other day.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

AWD/ji

1 - DCI

1 - C/EE

1 - ~~DD/P~~ w/basic (via to be sent to State)

1 - ER via Reading *W. Rostow*

STAT

(EXECUTIVE SECRET FILE)

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
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CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

50 MEMORIAL DRIVE
CAMBRIDGE 39, MASSACHUSETTS

March 15, 1960

Exclusive Registry

60-1918

Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Allen:

Herewith the little note about the Summit
Conference. I hope it is of some use.

It was great fun to see you, and I profited
from our talk.

Yours,

W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow

WWR:lh

Enclosure

A NOTION ABOUT THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

1. As an out-of-date tourist of Eastern Europe and Russia (April-May, 1959) and a newspaper reader, I would bet on an even money basis that Mr. K. plans to make a grandiose gesture towards the underdeveloped areas at the Summit Conference. The form of the gesture may be a proposal to combine and enlarge East-West aid efforts. Its purpose--as with the U. N. speech--would be to gain political capital by proposing something impossible to act on seriously, whose lack of seriousness would be difficult to sort out.

2. The only thing I can add with conviction is that U. S. and Western staff work should prepare itself on a contingency basis for this possibility. With less conviction, I would propose that the following U. S. seizure of the initiative be considered.

3. A Possible U. S. Initiative. The advantages of a U. S. initiative would be three:

--It would (as with aerial inspection in 1955) leave an impression of Western purpose and vigor; and in one key area of contention it would put the U. S. S. R. on the defensive.

--It would permit the West to anticipate and to avoid certain complications which might arise if Mr. K. took the initiative.

--It might help marginally to create a favorable setting in the underdeveloped areas and in the U. N., should the Berlin question build up to major crisis proportions at a later date.

4. The disadvantage of such a U. S. initiative is, of course, that it might engage us in negotiations with the U. S. S. R., which, even if harmless, we do not desire; for the U. S. proposal must be one with which we'd be prepared to live if it is accepted.

5. What the President might say is this:

--In addition to the control of armaments the central issue on the world scene is the peaceful and constructive modernization of the underdeveloped areas; that the West regards their development as a positive objective quite aside from military alliances; and the major powers have a duty to aid without complicating their lives unnecessarily with Cold War considerations.

--To these ends the Western powers and Japan are now engaged in an exploration of how they might more effectively concert their measures of assistance, for the long pull.

--In the light of the forthcoming American elections, it would be unwise for these negotiations to reach a definitive conclusion until next year.

--In any case, we must draw the lesson from post-war experience that Soviet and Western objectives in many of the underdeveloped areas differ; and, therefore, Western efforts must not be made contingent on what the Soviet Union may or may not be willing to do cooperatively.

--Therefore, we propose that, awaiting the emergence of definite Western plans, a separate committee of the Big Four explore whether and on what terms Soviet and Western assistance might be coordinated.

6. I do not believe it beyond the wit of our draftsmen to make this quite an eloquent and effective move, in which the positive aspects outweigh the fine print.

7. What lies behind the caution reflected in this proposal is the judgment that Moscow is likely now to view Molotov's withdrawal from Paris in 1947 as a major error, and that Moscow would like nothing better than to get a man into the middle of Mr. Dillon's explorations.

8. It may be objected that the underdeveloped areas would regard the suggested Western caution as less than forthcoming. In my view the effective leadership in these areas would understand and welcome this caution, because they are dead serious about getting more aid and would take, on the whole, an Ernie Bevin view of mixing up the Western and Soviet efforts. I would judge their efforts to force aid into the U. N. as essentially symbolic. And I sense an increasing realism among their citizens as well.

9. Whether it is decided that an American outflanking initiative is in order, however, I do believe it the course of wisdom to be prepared in this matter.

W. W. Rostow

March 15, 1960